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Federal Tort Claims Act: Limitations Period for Wrongful Death
Begins Running at Date of Death
In Kington v. United States' the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has held that a claim for wrongful death under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA)2 "accrues" at the date of death and the
statute of limitations begins to run at that date, rather than at the date
the cause of death is discovered. During the years 1946 and 1947, the
plaintiff's husband was exposed to beryllium while working in
federally-owned atomic energy facilities at Los Alamos, New Mexico.
The husband died on July 6, 1964, but the cause of death, allegedly
beryllium poisoning resulting from the exposure 17 years earlier, was
not determined until an autopsy was completed almost two months
later. On August 29, 1966, more than two years after the husband's
death but less than two years after discovery of the alleged cause of
death, the plaintiff filed suit for wrongful death under the FTCA,
alleging negligent operation by the United States, through its Atomic
Energy Commission, of a plant using inherently dangerous materials.,
The district court granted the defendant's motion for dismissal on the
grounds that the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations4 barred the
action.' The court of appeals, rejecting appellant's argument that the
claim did not arise until the cause of death was discovered, or by the
exercise of ordinary care should have been discovered, held that the
cause of action accrued at the date of death and affirmed the district
court's order.
The question of when a statute of limitations begins to run for a
cause of action against the United States for non-traumatic injury
was unsettled for many years.6 This problem, particularly
troublesome in a personal-injury action in which the negligent act
occurred many years before the injury became known or before the
source of cause of the injury was discovered, was finally considered by
the Supreme Court in Urie v. Thompson.' The Court decided that it
'396 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1968).
' Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
Kington v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1964).
265 F. Supp. at 702.
6See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1200-44
(1950).
'337 U.S. 163 (1949).
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was not Congress' purpose in establishing the statute of limitations in
the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) to cause one afflicted
with an "unknown and inherently unknowable" injury to be barred
from recovery due to his own "blameless ignorance"; and it therefore
held that, for purposes of the statute of limitations, a cause of action
for negligent infliction of occupational disease does not accrue until
the specific nature of the disease in the particular plaintiff is
discoverable.' Thus, in Urie the claim accrued at diagnosis since a
determination that the disease was silicosis immediately provided
knowledge of both the cause and source of the railroad fireman's
disability. 0 Decisions in FELA wrongJil death actions, however, have
established a more definite time for the accrual of the cause of
action-the date of death." The principal decision in this area,
Reading Company v. Koons,12 held that the cause of action accrues at
death rather than when an administrator is appointed because all
events which determine the employer's liability have occurred prior to
death and because, under the Act, the beneficiaries can bring suit
while awaiting appointment of an administrator.'3
While no FELA or FTCA cases prior to Kington have considered
statute-of-limitations treatment in the context of an "undiscovered"
cause-of-death situation, recent cases involving "undiscovered" non-
traumatic personal injury have followed the Urie rationale that the
limitations period does not begin until the plaintiff has a reasonable
opportunity to know those facts which give notice of the invasion of
his legal rights. '" For a personal injury claim to exist, there must have
545 U.S.C. § 56 (1964).
9337 U.S. at 168-70.
I0 1d. at 170.
"See, e.g., Baltimore & O.S.W. R.R. v. Carroll, 280 U.S. 491 (1930); Reading Co. v. Koons,
271 U.S. 58 (1926).
,271 U.S. 58 (1926).
"Id. at 62.
U See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Ford, 92 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1955), modifiedon rehearing,
92 So. 2d 164 (1956); Imiola v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R., 45 Misc. 2d 502, 257 N.Y.S.2d 195
(Sup. Ct. 1965). See also Estep & Van Dyke, Radiation Injuries: Statute of Limitations
Inadequacies in Tort Cases, 62 MICH. L. REV. 753, 764-69 (1964); Developments in the
Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1203-04 (1950); Note, 45 ORE. L.
REV.73, 76-77 (1965).
Compare the situation in civil antitrust actions under a similar federal statute of limitations,
15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1964), where it is settled that fraudulent concealment prevents the running of
the limitations period until the existence of the conspiracy is or should have been discovered,
Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912 (1962),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963), and where it is suggested that the same result will occur if the
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occurred both a negligent act and an injury resulting therefrom. For
the claim to be maintained, the plaintiff must know of his injury; the
nature of the injury; the cause of the injury; the source of the injury's
cause; and the negligent act which allowed the cause to operate upon
him. Since knowledge of all these facts is necessary before one fully
realizes that his legal rights have been invaded, the prolonged dispute
over when the statute of limitations begins to run in personal injury
actions under federal legislation has been resolved in favor of
beginning the limitation period on the date by which the plaintiff knew
or should have known those facts connecting the injury with the
negligent act. Where diagnosis of the nature of the illness provided
this connection, the court held that the statute did not begin to run
until diagnosis of the plaintiff's condition was possible."3 Where
diagnosis of the disease was not synonymous with knowledge that the
injury was afflicted by the defendant, the claim did not accrue until
the cause and source of the injury were discoverable. 6 Where knowl-
edge was inadequate concerning the existence of the acts upon which
the claim was based, the running of the statute was delayed until such
knowledge became available. 7 Thus, past precedent has employed the
concept of fair notice in defining the standard of "discovery" which
starts the statute running as knowledge of those facts connecting act
with injury. The presumption that the hardships imposed upon a
corporate governmental entity by an indeterminate period of liability
are not as significant as when the defendant is an individual, is
arguably a further justification for this liberal interpretation in FTCA
actions.'"
The Kington court, although aware of this recent authority,
passed over it as inapplicable because it dealt with personal injury
rather than wrongful death actions. The first of the court's three
reasons for rejecting the date of "discovery" was that the traditional
conspiracy is merely concealed by its very nature without fraudulent action by the defendant,
Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
Young v. Clinchfield R.R., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 196 1) (FELA action).
Kuhne v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) (FTCA action); Anderson v.
Southern Pac. Co., 23! Cal. App. 2d 233,41 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1964) (FELA action).
" Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1965); Beech v. United States, 345 F.2d 872
(5th Cir. 1965); Hungerford v. United States, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962); Quinton v. United
States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962); Johnson v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ark.
1967) (all FTCA actions).
'"See, e.g., Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1962) (FTCA statute of
limitations viewed as exception to general provision that government is liable as a private
individual would be).
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date of accrual in "similar" actions is the date of death. However, the
cases relied upon by the court for this position involved accrual for
purposes other than determining the operation of the limitations
period upon claims arising from belatedly discovered injury. One case
primarily involved the relation-back of an amended complaint, and in
deciding that the cause of action accrued at the time of death, the
court sought to point out the distinction between survival and
wrongful death actions.' 9 Another case involved the choice between
time of death and appointment of an administrator as the moment of
accrual,20 and a third case mentioned the date of death only in
discussing the measurement of the life expectancy of the decedent's
parents.2' The Kington decision was secondly based upon the
assumption that the cause and source of death can be ascertained
shortly after death by autopsy. No authority for such a proposition
was given, and this assumption overlooks recent cases involving
radioactivity-induced diseases where the cause or source of the
malady was not discovered for as long as five years after the original
diagnosis.22 Medical science, particularly in the field of radiation
poisoning, apparently cannot provide immediate answers to the
source and cause of all diseases, even after extensive and detailed
testing.- While the majority noted, as a third point, that the plaintiff
in Kington still had twenty-two months after the cause of death was
discovered in which to file the complaint,'4 the dissenting judge
recognized that if the Kington rule is inflexibly followed, the party
who is unable to discover the cause of the decedent's death within two
years from the date of death will be foreclosed from any possibility of
compensation. -
Since federal law rather than state law apparently determines
when an FTCA claim accrues for purposes of commencing the
limitations period,' 6 there appears to be no compelling reason why the
I Baltimore & O.S.W. R.R. v. Carroll, 280 U.S. 491, 495 (1930), citing Reading Co. V.
Koons, 271 U.S. 58 (1926).
2' Foote v. Public Housing Comm'r of United States, 107 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mich. 1952).
See text following note I I supra.
Renaldi v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 230 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1956).
. See cases cited note 16 supra.
Young v. Clinchfield R.R., 288 F.2d 499, 504 (4th Cir. 1961); E. STASON, S. ESTEP & W.
PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAw 421-511 (1959); Estep & Van Dyke,.supra note 14. See cases cited
note 15 supra.
Kington v. United States, 396 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1968).
I d. at 12 (dissenting opinion).26See. e.g., Beech v. United States, 345 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1965); Kossick v. United States,
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same considerations which led to the development of the "date of
discovery" rule in personal injury cases should not be applied to
wrongful death actions under the same federal legislation. The much-
disputed distinction between a special statute of limitations,
compliance with which is a condition precedent to statutory wrongful
death actions, and a general statute of limitations which merely bars a
common-law claim after a specified time,!' is afforded no relevance by
the language of the FTCA, which provides both the right of action
and the limitation thereon, drawing no distinction between an action
for injury and one for death.2" Moreover, the principal dispute in the
wrongful death area has previously been whether the claim accrues at
the time of the injury or at the time of death and has not involved the
unknowable-cause problem.29 Thus, most courts have had no reason
to consider an accrual date later than that of death and implicitly
assumed that death serves as adequate notice of a possible violation of
one's legal rights.'" The Kington decision and the harsh results it will
produce in cases where notice of the invasion of legal rights is not
provided at death are open to considerable criticism, especially in light
of contrary developments in the personal injury field. In favoring
administrative efficiency and protection from "stale" claims rather
than the preservation of a claim until the potential claimant has a
realistic opportunity to discover its existence, Kington appears in
conflict with the present judicial trend. Thus, the time of death as the
inception of the limitations period probably will not be adhered to if a
case against the government should arise in which a claim would be
barred before its discovery is possible.
330 F.2d 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 837 (1964); Maryland ex rel. Burkhardt v. United
States, 165 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1947). Contra Tessier v. United States, 269 F.2d 305 (Ist Cir.
1959); Meyers v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 913 (N.D.N.Y. 1958). A commencement-of-the-
limitations-period issue should be distinguished from determination of whether the claim is
premature. See Bizer v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (prematurity issue).
2'See, e.g., Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965); 25A C.J.S. Death § 53
(1966); cf. Simon v. United States, 244 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1957).
2- 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-80 (1964).
29See22 AI. JUR. 2d Death § 40 (1965); Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 1151, 1154-55 (1964).
3"See, e.g., McGhee v. Cheasapeake & O.R.R., 173 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich. 1959); Imiola
v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R., 45 Misc. 2d 502, 257 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1965) (FELA case). See also
Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1203 (1950).
1206 [Vol. 1968: 1202
